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Abstract 
The recent global financial tsunami (2007 – present) has swiped the whole world with disastrous 
consequences, leading to the bankruptcy of major banks, trillions of dollars in economic rescues, 
and major national economic failures. Unlike previous financial crisis, one major driver of this 
crisis is the contagious failures of banks through a network of interbank payments and correlated 
bank portfolios of financial products. The risk that the failure of a single bank can cause a 
cascading failure of other connected banks and may potentially bring down the entire banking 
system (network), is defined as systemic risk. Existing bank risk management research focused on 
the causes and impacts of systemic risk but largely ignored the monitoring and preventive 
mechanism. In this study, we developed a network-based algorithm to rank systemic risk of banks 
and financial products in the bank network. In addition, we extended the network model of 
banking system developed in previous systemic risk research and adopted this model in the 
evaluation experiment of our proposed algorithm. This algorithm may provide an effective 
mechanism for stakeholders in the banking industry to monitor and reduce systemic risk and 
thereby prevent system-wide breakdown in bank networks. 
Keywords: Contagious Bank Failure, System Risks, Ranking Algorithm, Network Analysis 
Knowledge Management and Business Intelligence 
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Introduction 
The recent global financial tsunami (2007 – present) has been considered by many economists as the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s (Bullard et al. 2009; Pendery 2009). It has resulted in the collapse of 
major financial institutions like Lehman Brothers, downturns of stock markets around the world, and even 
breakdowns of financial systems in several countries like Greece and Iceland. Although the immediate cause or 
trigger for this crisis is the burst of the U.S. housing bubble and the following liquidity shortfall of major banks, the 
mechanism that spreads and magnifies their impacts is the largely interconnected U.S. bank network (Harrington 
2009; Markose et al. 2010). In this network, banks are connected with each other through interbank payments and 
correlated bank portfolios (i.e. owning the same financial product(s) such as IBM stock) (Elsinger et al. 2006). A 
bank’s solvency largely depends on the interbank payments it receives from other banks in the network and the 
value of its portfolio of financial products. As such, the value of a bank depends on the financial health of the 
relevant bank network. Therefore, correlation in interbank payments and bank portfolio values can result in 
contagion of insolvency between banks in this network in a domino effect. 
To illustrate how this contagion of insolvency lead to bank failures, Figure 1 shows a simple bank network 
containing three banks A, B and C, and two financial products (e.g., securities, bonds or financial derivatives) X and 
Y. A solid line in the figure represents an interbank payment relationship between two banks while a dotted line 
represents an ownership relationship between a bank and a financial product. We use an out-link to represent an 
ownership relationship between a bank and a financial product because only the default of a financial product has an 
impact on an owner bank, not the other way around. Nevertheless, this simple bank network illustrates interbank 
payment relationships among banks and their interdependencies due to holding of same financial products. As 
Figure 1 shows, Bank A has a payment relationship with Bank B, and Bank A owns a certain share of Financial 
Product X. In this network, a contagious failure may happen as followings. A sudden decrease in the market value of 
financial product X may cause Bank A to default on its payment obligations to Bank B. Such a default along with 
the decreased value of X may in turn lead Bank B to fail on its payment obligations to Bank C. A default by C may, 
in turn, have a major feedback effect on A and potentially bankrupt A. This example illustrates the risk of domino 
collapsing in a banking system, starting with the default of a single bank through a contagious failure process in a 












Figure.1 An Illustration of Bank Network 
In a bank network, systemic risk refers to the risks associated with the interlinkages and interdependencies among 
banks, where the failure of a single bank or a group of banks can cause a cascading failure of other connected banks, 
which may potentially bring down the entire banking system (network). However, existing research on banking 
regulation and monitoring mainly focused on the risk at the level of the individual bank (Elsinger et al. 2006) but 
largely overlooked the systemic risk. New models and methods that can discover hidden systemic risks in the bank 
network are needed to prevent the potential buildup of systemic risks that may cause the breakdown of the whole 
banking system.  
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Therefore, it is important to take a system-wide and network perspective to model and analyze systemic risks, and 
devise effective mechanisms to monitor, manage and prevent such type of risks. The main modeling challenge, 
identified by Elsinger et al. (2006), is to effectively capture the two major sources of systemic risks: 1) correlated 
bank investment portfolios that may result in simultaneous insolvency of multiple banks due to negative shocks in 
financial markets; 2)Banks may default on their interbank payments towards other banks and thus cause them to 
default or even bankrupt triggering a domino effect. Elsinger et al. (2006) improved a network-based interbank 
payment model proposed in Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and adopted simulation method to study these two sources of 
systemic risks in Austrian banking system. However, their analysis focused on simulating the system-wide impacts 
of potential contagious default events on the banks in various stress scenarios. There is a lack of systematic approach 
to model and analyze the level of systemic risk associated with each bank and financial product in the bank network. 
Such approach is particular useful for financial regulators and other stakeholders when devising strategies or 
mechanisms to prevent or mitigate systemic risks. For instance, before or during the breakdown of the banking 
system, it would be crucial to know which banks to save (inject capital) and which toxic financial assets to deal with 
first, in order to stabilize the whole banking system and keep its solvency. 
To address this problem, first we modified Elsinger’s interbank payment model by incorporating the other major 
source of systemic risk – correlated bank portfolios. Based on this model, we build a bank network model in which 
nodes are banks and financial products, while links are interbank payment (between banks) and ownership 
relationships (between banks and financial products).We then develop a network-based algorithm based on the HITS 
algorithm (Kleinberg 1999) to model and rank the systemic risk associated with each bank and financial product. At 
last, we propose to use simulation methods to evaluate the effectiveness of our ranking algorithm in future research. 
We plan to simulate different stress scenarios using real-world data on the U.S. banking system.  
We claim three contributions in this research. Firstly, based on Elsinger’s interbank payment model, we developed a 
bank network model which incorporates the interrelationships between banks and financial products they own. This 
model better represents the real-world banking system and provides the basis for studying systemic risks associated 
with correlated portfolios of financial products. Secondly, we developed a network-based ranking algorithm that can 
be used to rank banks according their systemic risks.  This information is useful to bank regulators that need to make 
decisions on what banks to save first in order to prevent a possible system-wide breakdown. The ranking result can 
also help individual banks to identify financial products associated with high systemic risks that may has significant 
negative impacts on their investment portfolios during financial crisis. Thirdly, this research contributes to the 
literature of financial risk management by studying systemic financial risks in the banking sector with a network-
based approach. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review related studies. The third section 
introduces a mathematical model of banking system based on Elsinger’s interbank payment model (2006). The 
fourth section describes the proposed network-based ranking algorithm. Then we outline a plan to evaluate the 
effectiveness of our proposed algorithm using simulation techniques.  Finally, we discuss the possible implications 
and potential contributions of our research.  
Related Studies 
Our study proposes to use a business intelligence approach for managing systemic risk in the bank networks. In this 
section, we review relevant studies in business intelligence and bank risk management, as well as the network-based 
ranking algorithm related to the systemic risk ranking algorithm developed in our research.   
Business Intelligence and Bank Risk Management 
Various business Intelligence (BI) techniques have been employed to manage bank risk, mostly focusing on 
predictions of bank failures. These studies often adopt Artificial Intelligence and data mining techniques on real-
world banking data, aiming to discover the causes of bank failures and successfully predict potential failures. These 
techniques include Neural Networks (NN), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Bayesian Networks (BN), and other 
common classification algorithms. Tam et al. (1992) has demonstrated the effectiveness of Neural Networks 
technique in bank failure predictions. A fuzzy support vector machine method for credit risk assessment in banking 
industry is proposed in Wang et al. (2005). Sarkar and Sriram (2001) have applied  Bayesian Networks models for 
early warning of bank failures. In addition, Data mining methods have also been used in the research about anti-
Knowledge Management and Business Intelligence 
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money laundering (John 2004; Zhongfei et al. 2003). In general, these business intelligence techniques can provide 
novel insights different from traditional financial risk management techniques for decision makers in the banking 
industry to achieve better risk measurement, assessment and mitigation. 
However, there are mainly two issues for existing research using business intelligence techniques on bank risk 
management. Firstly, the analyses in these studies mainly focus at the level of individual banks or institutions but 
largely overlook the systemic risk. Secondly, relevant with the previous issue, the relational (network) data such as 
interbank payment is rarely studied. Thus network analysis techniques or network-based ranking algorithm is rarely 
used for bank risk management. Our research aims to address these two issues by 1) adopting a network perspective 
to model systemic risk associated with interbank payments and correlated bank portfolios, and 2) developing 
network-based ranking algorithm for systemic risk mitigation in bank networks.  
Network-based Ranking Algorithms 
With the fast development of digital communication networks (e.g., World Wide Web) in the past decades, various 
network-based algorithms have been developed to rank the relative importance of nodes in these networks. For 
instance, these algorithms are widely adopted in modern web search engines like Google and Yahoo which 
effectively search and rank the web pages on the World Wide Web. Most of such algorithms utilize the network 
structural information such as degree (i.e., the number of links a node has) for ranking node importance. Two most 
widely used algorithms are Google’s Pagerank (Brin and Page 1998) and the HITS algorithm developed by 
Kleinberg (1999). Other network-based ranking algorithms include CLEVER (Chakrabarti et al. 1998) project in 
IBM, SALSA (Lempel and Moran 2001), as well as TrustRank (Gyöngyi et al. 2004). However, these algorithms 
are mainly used in information retrieval, but have rarely been used in other areas.  
Our systemic risk ranking algorithm is based on the HITS algorithm (Kleinberg 1999) which is designed to rank the 
importance of individual web pages on the Internet. The HITS algorithm calculates two scores for each webpage– 
the authority score and the hub score. The authority score measures the value of the content for the web page, while 
the hub score estimates the value of the web page’s links to other pages. Authority and hub scores are defined in 
terms of one another in a mutual recursion. An authority score is computed as the sum of the scaled hub scores that 
point to that page. A hub score is the sum of the scaled authority scores of the pages it points to. Both scores for 
each web page are calculated multiple times and normalized in multiple iterations until they converge. 
A Network-based Model of Banking System 
In this research, we develop a network-based model of banking system mainly for analyzing systemic risks and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed ranking algorithm. We use this model along with real-world bank-
related data to simulate the impacts of various economic shocks on banks and the financial products they own. We 
also simulate how the proposed algorithm can be used to reduce contagious failures in the bank network under these 
shocks. Our model is mainly based on the banking system model developed by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and 
extended by Elsinger et al. (2006). We modify it to include the systemic risks originated from the correlated bank 
portfolios.  
Considering a set of },..,1{  N N= banks, each bank Ni∈  has a value ie which represents the value of this bank’s 
total assets. The total value of a bank is the sum of its total assets ie , the value of this bank’s portfolio of financial 
products, and the value of all interbank payments it received, minus its interbank payment liabilities towards other 
banks. If the total value of a bank becomes negative, the bank is insolvent. Therefore, there are three components in 
the total value of a bank – total assets of the bank, the bank’s portfolio of financial products, the interbank payments 
receivable from other banks or interbank liabilities. We then describe our model of banking system in the following 
three sub sections. 
Correlated Bank Portfolios 
The major difference between our model and the model developed by Elsinger et al. (2006) is the inclusion of the 
correlated bank portfolio component. Elsinger et al. (2006) indentified that one of the major sources of systemic 
risks is the shared holdings of the same financial product(s) in different bank portfolios, causing correlated changes 
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in bank portfolio values when the prices of these shared financial products change. For instance, the burst of housing 
bubble has caused major banks to suffer heavy losses in many asset-backed securities (ABS) they own such as 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) (Krahnen and Wilde 2006) and Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) (Markose et al. 2010). Such loss in correlated bank portfolios may largely reduce the payment 
abilities of these banks simultaneously, causing their insolvency. However, Elsinger et al. (2006) did not explicitly 
include this systemic risk component and evaluate its impacts in their model of banking system.  
In our modified model of banking system, we develop and include a correlated bank portfolio component to 
represent this source of systemic risk. We define ib  as the value of a bank i’s investment on a portfolio of financial 







where kR  is financial product k’s market closing price at the observation day and ikV  is the volume the bank i held 
at the end of that day.  
Interbank Payment 
To model interbank payments, we use a NN ×  matrix L , in which ijl  represents bank i’s payment obligation 
towards bank j and N  represents the set of all banks in the banking system. Therefore, the value of bank i’s total 
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Clearing Payment Vector 
Then the banking system can be described as the sum of the three aforementioned components – total assets e, 
correlated bank portfolio b, and the interbank payment obligations d. Following Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and 
























































This payment vector 
*
ip  is used to represent total interbank payments made by bank i to the rest of the banking 
system under the clearing mechanism. It has limited liability and proportional sharing in case of bankruptcy.  
Using this payment vector, we can easily identify the insolvent banks in the system if ii dp <
*
. In that case, the 










depVR π .  
A contagious default may happen on Bank i in one of the two following scenarios:  
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 One or more banks are not be able to keep their payment promises to Bank i, causing i’s insolvency. Using our 
















depVR π . 
 The defaults of one or more correlated financial products in bank i’s portfolio can reduce the portfolio value ib . 
At the same time, they can also reduce the payment abilities of banks that have obligations to i. Together these 

















depVR π , where 'kR  denotes the market closing price of financial product k 
that become default. 
To summarize, this model of the banking system is developed for simulating the contagious defaults of banks under 
various stress scenarios and how our ranking algorithm can help reduce systemic risk in the bank network. In 
addition, the design of the ranking algorithm has also utilized representations developed in this model. 
A Network-based Algorithm for Ranking Systemic Risks 
Existing risk management research focused on econometric analysis of market and credit risks. Although there are 
several studies taking a network perspective to study the systemic risks in the banking systems (Eisenberg and Noe 
2001; Elsinger et al. 2006; Markose et al. 2010; May and Arinaminpathy 2010), no effective mechanisms or 
algorithms have been proposed to measure and manage such risks. In this study, we developed a algorithm that is 
based on the famous HITS algorithm  (Kleinberg 1999) to rank systemic risks for each bank and financial product in 
the bank network. Although the HITS algorithm is initially designed to measure the importance of web pages in the 
densely interconnected Would Wide Web, the underlying mechanism can be applied in many other domains. The 
importance (of a web page) is a characteristic that cannot be directly measured. HITS algorithm is essentially using 
the links a web page received from other web pages to quantify and measure its importance. The assumption is that, 
if a web page A provides a hyperlink that connects to web page B, A is actually offering its recognition to enhance 
the importance of web page B through this hyperlink. Therefore, the authority score of the web page A calculated 
using HITS is actually measuring the overall impacts of recognitions offered by all web pages that links to A. The 
hub score is measuring the overall impacts of recognitions A offered to the web pages it links to. 
We developed a network-based algorithm using the same underlying mechanism of HITS algorithm to measure and 
then rank the systemic risks associated with banks mainly for three reasons Firstly, like importance of web pages, 
the systemic risk associated with banks cannot be quantified and directly measured. Secondly, the systemic risk 
associated with a bank is a type of exogenous risk that originates from the possible defaults of banks that have 
interbank payment obligations with A and also from the financial products owned by A. Thirdly, the systemic risks 
mainly exists in a densely connected bank network and their impacts are mainly transmitted through the interbank 
payment relationships and the ownership (with financial products) relationships. 
We modified HITS algorithm to rank systemic risks in bank networks which are significantly different from ranking 
web page importance. First, there are two types of nodes in the bank network – banks and financial products. Thus 
we need to calculate both authority and hub scores for these two types of nodes. Second, since the possible defaults 
of financial products may cause the insolvency of banks, not the other way around, the financial product nodes only 
have out-links. Accordingly, in our algorithm, financial product nodes will only have hub scores. On the other hand, 
the default of banks may cause the insolvency of each other through interbank payment links. Therefore, bank nodes 
will have both in and out- links, along with the authority and hub scores. 
Measuring Systemic Risk Associated with Financial Product Nodes 
We firstly aim to measure the systemic risk associated with the financial product nodes from the banks’ perspective. 
We mainly focused on two factors: 
 The likelihood of the default of a financial product owned by a bank i. This is often linked to rating scores 
provided by credit agencies. We denote the probability of the default of a financial product k as )( Mkf k ∈ . 
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 The total impacts/losses caused by the default of a financial product k on its owner bank i. We denote that 
using */ iikk pVR∆ , where kR∆ is the change in the price of the product k caused by the default event. 
Together these two factors determine the expected impacts (possible loss) of the default of a financial product k on 
its owner bank i as )/( *iikkk pVRf ∆ . 
Measuring Systemic Risk Associated with Interbank Payments 
Then we aim to measure the systemic risks associated with the interbank payments in the bank network. We propose 
ijIP
 as a measure of the expected impacts (possible loss) caused by the default of an individual bank i on one of its 
debtor banks  j  through the interbank payment links.  That is 
)/( *jijij plCIP = , 
where C  is the average default rate for all banks in the bank network during a certain time period.  
Ranking Algorithm Design 
We then introduce the design our network-based ranking algorithm . Similar to HITS, our algorithm has an iterative 
process to update both hub score and authority score for the two types of nodes. One thing to note is that financial 
product nodes only have out-links while bank nodes have both in- and out-links. Thus the financial product nodes 
only have hub scores (FPHUB) and bank nodes have both authority (BANKAU) and hub scores (BANKHUB). 
 In the initial step, for each bank i, we calculate the coefficient for the hub score of the financial product k it 
owns as )/( *ikikkki pVRf ∆=α  as explained in the previous section. Then we set the coefficient for the bank 
i’s hub score to bank j as )/( *jijijij plCIP ==β . In this step, we are weighting the in-links of bank nodes 
based on the expected impacts of the two sources for these links. 
 Second, we start to update bank i’s authority score iBANKAU  as: 
∑∑ ∈∈ += Nj jjiMk kkii BANKHUBFPHUBBANKAU βα  (1) 
where M is the set of financial product owned by bank i, and N is the set of banks that have payment obligations to i. 
Similar to the HITS algorithm, initially both FPHUB and BANKHUB are set to one. This update process means that 
the authority score that rank bank i’s systemic risk is from the systemic risks associated with i’s portfolio of 
financial products, and all the banks that may affect i’s cash flow through possible defaults of interbank payments. 
The coefficients are the possible impacts of these two systemic risk sources on bank i. 
 Third, we update financial product k’s hub score as kFPHUB . This score represents the overall systemic risk 
financial product k may has (the possible loss of its default) on the whole bank network/system through its 
owner banks. Therefore, it is calculated as  
∑ ∈= Hj jjkk BANKAUSFPHUB  (2) 
where jkS is the percentage of the product k held by bank j, H is the set of banks that hold k. 
 Fourth, we update Bank i’s hub score as iBANKHUB . This score represents Bank i’s systemic risk (the 
possible loss of its default) on the whole bank network through the banks it has payment obligations. Therefore, 
it is calculated as  
∑ ∈= 'Nj jjii BANKAUOPBANKHUB  (3) 
Knowledge Management and Business Intelligence 
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where  jiOP  is the percentage of the bank j’s total incoming payments bank i’s payment occupies, and 'N is the set 
of banks that i has payment obligations.  
One thing to note is that for each iteration of this algorithm we normalize these three scores like the original HITS 
algorithm does. Then we repeatedly execute the three steps until these three scores converge. The convergence proof 
of our algorithm is similar with the proof for the weighted HITS algorithm in Bharat and Henzinger’s paper (1998). 
To explain this proof, we first unify the representations of bank nodes and financial product nodes by denoting 
]0,[BANKAUAU =  and ],[ FPHUBBANKHUBHUB =  as the unified authority score and hub score 









AW , where ijijB β=  
and ijijA α=  in formula (1) and B′ is the transpose of matrix B . The computation of the authority score can be 











HW  and the computation of 














*  in 
which all entries are positive. Following the Lemma 1 in (Bharat et al. 1998), after i iterations, the hub socre vector 
HUB which equals to ZD i *  will converge (Golub and Van Loan 1996), where Z  is a vector with each 
coordinate equal to 1. The authority score will converge for the same reason. The converged hub scores for each 
financial product and bank are our ranking scores for measuring their systemic risks.  
Evaluation of the Proposed Algorithm through Simulation 
To assess the effectiveness of this network-based ranking algorithm, we first plan to use a simulation approach to 
generate stress scenarios in which the bank network undergoes various types of major economic shocks. We also 
simulate how the contagious bank failures happen through the two sources of systemic risks modeled previously. In 
this simulation, it is assumed that there are two time points: t = 0, the observation day, and t = 1, the payment 
clearing date, when all interbank payments are settled according to the clearing vector *p we defined before. At t = 
0, the portfolio holdings of financial products b  for each bank are observed. In addition, the interbank payments 
among banks are modeled as a NN ×  matrix L . The remaining value of bank assets is represented as e . Both the 
values of b and e is exposed to various market and credit risk such as the sudden drop of prices for major financial 
products banks held. According the clearing payment vector *p  defined before, the value of 
*
p depends on the 
realization of such risk factors. To generate a stress scenario, we draw a realization of these risk factors using real-
world data such as interest rates and currency exchange rates, and revalue b and e for each bank to estimate its new 
value of *p . 
After generating various possible scenarios of contagious defaults of banks, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness 
of our proposed ranking algorithm. We will apply this algorithm to the data in each generated scenario for 
calculating and ranking the systemic risks associate with each bank and financial product. The output is a list of 
ranked banks and financial products based on the level of systemic risks they have. We then devise strategies based 
on this list to reduce the systemic risk in the bank network (e.g., prevent banks to purchase financial products with 
high systemic risk). We then compare the number and the rate of default banks (caused by contagious failures) 
between the original scenario and the one which use the algorithm to mitigate the systemic risks. For multiple 
scenarios, if the numbers of default banks in original scenarios are consistently and significantly larger than the ones 
in the scenarios that adopted our ranking algorithm. Then the algorithm will be proven to be effective in reducing 
systemic risks in bank networks. 
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Dataset 
In this study, we plan to use data from the Bank Regulatory and the Bank Holding Companies Databases in the 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). The Bank Regulatory Database contains accounting data for bank 
holding companies, commercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loans institutions. The source data is from 
the required regulatory forms filed for supervising purposes. The Bank Holding Companies Database collects 
financial data included in the FRY-9 reports which contain balance sheet, income information, risk-based capital 
measures and additional supporting schedules. The information in these two databases is mainly used to generate 
stress scenarios in our simulations of contagious failures in bank networks.  
Discussion and Future Work 
In summary, we developed a network-based ranking algorithm to rank systemic risk associated with banks and 
financial products in the bank networks. In addition, we extended Elsinger’s (2006) model of the banking system 
and plan to adopt it on real world banking data to simulate the effects of our proposed algorithm in reducing 
systemic risk (contagious failures) in the bank network. Our proposed research has both theoretical and practical 
contributions. Theoretically, it contributes to the research that aims to discover the causes and mechanisms of 
contagious bank failures in bank networks. It provides a novel network perspective for researchers to study how 
system-wide bank failures happen caused by the failures of several key banks or a market freeze. Empirically, our 
study intend to provide a network-based ranking mechanism for systemic risk associated with banks and financial 
products, aiming to help stakeholders in the banking industry to devise effective strategies for reducing such 
systemic risk. The long term goal is to prevent system-wide breakdown in the banking system by identifying banks 
and financial products with high systemic risk and reducing such risk before total meltdown.  
Our future work consists of three parts. First, we need to collect data from the Bank Regulatory and the Bank 
Holding Companies Databases in WRDS. Second, we will construct the bank network and generate various stress 
scenarios for the banking system. Third, we then compare the numbers of contagious bank failures in original 
scenarios and in scenarios that adopted our proposed network-based algorithm for systemic risk mitigation. We 
believe our algorithm offers a new way to estimate systemic risk (contagious bank failures) in a bank network under 
various stress scenarios. 
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